Contracting issues associated with reduction of Repair Turnaround Time within the Contract Depot Maintenance (CDM)--program. by Petty, Roger Ellsworth. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1987
Contracting issues associated with reduction of


























Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
T239i 7

ECURI'i'V CLASS:f C-^' ON O^ "- S
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
^^iAia:j^sk*¥BbASSir CA' ON 'b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
la SECURITY C-ASSiFiCATiON AuTr^ORn Y
Ih OECLASSiFiCA'^ON DOvVNGRADTjG SCHEDULE
3 OlSTBlBUTIOM/A'^^ILABIUTY OF.Fl£P,ORT _Approved tor pablic release;
distribution is unlimited.
a. PERFORMING ORGANlZA'lOtN REPORT ,\iuMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NL'MBER(S)
5a NAME OF PERFORMNG 0-G- -.iZA-.QN J 6b OFF'CE SYMBOL
Naval Postgraduate School C76d«/'(^S^^
7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
3c. ADDRESS \Cty, State, ana ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (Gty, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









1 TITLE (Include Security Classification}
CONTRACTING ISSUES ASSOCIATED VITH REDUCTION OP REPAIR TURNAROUND TIME
WITHIN THE CONTRACT DEPOT MAINTENANCE (CDM) PROGRAM
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
PETTY, Roger E











18 SUBJECT TERMS {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Material, Maintenance, Depot Maintenance,
Contract Maintenance, Reparable items. Mainten-
ance Workloads, Government Furnished Material
19 ABSTRAC"!" {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis examines the key contracting issues that have caused Repair
Turnaround Time (RTAT) of Depot Level Repairables (DLR's) under the
Contractor Depot Maintenance (CDM) program to be excessive. Many of the
DLR's repaired by commercial depots under this program exceed the Naval
Supply System Command's goal of 60 days for items managed by the Navy
Ships Part Control Center (SPCC) and 45 days for items managed by the
Aviation Supply Office (ASO). SPCC, ASO and four commercial depots were
visited to gather RTAT data on DLR's and identify potential improvements
in the CDM program that would reduce RTAT. An analysis of the policies
and procedures used by SPCC and ASO in requirements determination as well
as the effects of the repair workload forecast on the CDM process %#as also
conducted. Recommendations are made to reduce RTAT through the contrac-
tual vehicle utilized and enhanced demand forecasting.
20 Distribution availas-lit-' of abstract
[J[UNCLASSIFIED.UNL Vi^Ej D :AME AS RPT n OTIC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
iiwrxAagiPiED
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE 'ND'ViDUAl
p^y"^
22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) :2c OFFICE SYMBOL
30 FORM 1473, 34Mao 33 APR edit on ma'^ be used unfl exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
tt U.S. Government Printing Office 1 9 8 6—606 24.
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited




Contract Depot Maintenance (CDM) Program
by
Roger Ellsworth Petty
Lieutenant Commander, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy
B.S., Miami University, 1977
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1987 /j /
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the key contracting issues that
have caused Repair Turnaround Time (RTAT) of Depot Level
Repairables (DLR's) under the Contractor Depot Maintenance
(CDM) program to be excessive. Many of the DLR's repaired
by commercial depots under this program exceed the Naval
Supply System Command's goal of 60 days for items managed by
the Navy Ships Part Control Center (SPCC) and 45 days for
items managed by the Aviation Supply Office (ASO). SPCC,
ASO and four commercial depots were visited to gather RTAT
data on DLR's and identify potential improvements in the CDM
program that would reduce RTAT. An analysis of the policies
and procedures used by SPCC and ASO in requirements deter-
mination as well as the effects of the repair workload
forecast on the CDM process was also conducted. Recommen-
dations are made to reduce RTAT through the contractual




B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 7
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 7
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 8
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 8
II. CONTRACT DEPOT MAINTENANCE 10
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 10
B. BACKGROUND 10
C. REPAIR SOURCE SELECTION 12
D. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION 14
E. CONTRACTOR REPAIR ACTIVITIES 15
F. CONTRACT DEPOT RTAT 2 2
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 2 4
III. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT DEPOT RTAT 25
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 25
B. WORKLOAD FORECASTING 25
C. PIECE PART LAY-IN 28
D. TOOLING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 31
E. UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS 32
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 3 4
DUDLEY Kmx LIBRARV
MONTEREY. CALIFORNIAS BOOS
IV. KEY ISSUES IN COMMERCIAL REPAIR BOAS 35
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 3 5
B. REPAIR BOA TERMS AND CONDITIONS 35
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 41
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... 42
A. SUMMARY 42
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 3
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 46
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .... 48
APPENDIX: DOP SELECTION DECISION TREE 50
LIST OF REFERENCES 51
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 53
I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
This thesis examines the contracting Issues associated
with Depot Level Repairable ( DLR ) maintenance performed by
commercial sources of repair. Specifically, the research
explores the methodologies being utilized by Navy activities
to improve Repair Turnaround Time (RTAT) of these commercial
sources
.
In broad terms, RTAT is the time period between the time
of component failure and the return of that component to a
ready for issue (RFI) condition. The non-availability of
this component necessitates the procurement of additional
assets to insure availability during the period of turn-
around time. This investment is known as "pipeline."
Whenever RTAT is protracted, additional Investment in
pipeline assets is required.
During late 1985 the Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) established the reduction of RTAT as a priority
project in the NAVSUP Strategic Plan [Ref. 1], This action
resulted from the adverse impact that protracted RTAT was
having on the budgetary (stratification) investment figure
utilized in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development.
In general, it was felt that reduction of RTAT at ASO and
SPCC to 45 and 60 days, respectlvly, would result In a $100
million reduction in pipeline investment (Ref. 2].
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
The main objectives of this research effort are to:
1. Provide a brief overview of the Contract Depot Repair
cycle
.
2. Review the issues impacting Contract Depot Repair
Turnaround Times.
3. Examine the impact that current contract vehicles are
having on RTAT with a view toward presenting recommen-
dations that will assist in the overall reduction of
Contract Depot RTAT.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was as follows:
What are the key contracting issues and what method-
ologies might be utilized to reduce Repair Turnaround Time
within the Contract Depot Maintenance program?
The subsidiary questions were as follows:
1. What is Contract Depot Maintenance and how has it been
utilized on Navy repairable components?
2. What are the principal contracting variables or
factors which affect Repair Turnaround Time?
3. What are the critical areas where improvements can be
made within the contracting process to facilitate
Repair Turnaround Time reductions?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The topic of this thesis evolved from a comprehensive
study of current literature that stressed the need for the
Navy to more effectively manage depot level repairables.
Unfortunately, this literature did not address the specific
issue of how to reduce repair turnaround time within the
Contract Depot Maintenance (CDM) program. As a consequence,
a more complete understanding of the program and repair
cycle had to be obtained through personal and telephonic
interviews. Information was collected from the following:
1. Navy Supply Systems Command's Contracting Management
Division .
2. Technical and contracting personnel at the Ships Parts
Control Center (SPCC) and Aviation Supply Office
(ASO)
.
3. Directors of Contracting and Production at the
geographically selected facilities identified below.
- Varian Associates, Inc., Microwave Tube Division
- Hughes Aircraft Co., Ground Systems Group
- Western Division GTE Government Systems Corp.
- AiResearch Mfg. Company of CA.
- Kaiser Electronics
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II describes the Contract Depot Maintenance
cycle. A brief explanation of key segments of the depot
repair cycle Is given to provide the reader with an under-
standing of the complexities Involved. Chapter III dis-
cusses causative factors which have contributed to excessive
RTAT at contract depots. Chapter IV presents the results of
a modified case study designed to underscore the RTAT
benefits being derived by ASO and SPCC in current repair
agreements. An executive summary of the problem is provided
in Chapter V along with conclusions and recommendations that
will assist the ICPs reduction of Contract Depot Repair
Turnaround Time.
II . CONTRACT DEPOT MAINTENANCE
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter introduces the reader to the process
utilized in determining the quantities of assets to be
repaired by Contract Depot Maintenance (CDM) and the steps
involved in contractor repair. A detailed description of
contractor repair activities is provided to highlight the




Government managers are responsible for obtaining items
needed to support the Military Departments missions in the
most cost-effective and timely manner. Program managers
choose to repair rather than buy new parts in support of
weapon systems whenever possible due to the significance of
the savings obtainable both in time and money. The repairs
of these parts will be effected by either government
(organic) or contractor repair depots to sustain a main-
tenance mobilization base capable of expansion within a
limited timeframe.
DoD policies relating to depot maintenance are contained
in two separate documents. The first. Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) Circular No. A-76, states that DoD should
rely on the private sector except when there is some
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compelling reason to retain In-house capability. A-76
realizes that agencies need to consider economy and mobiliz-
ation readiness when deciding between organic and commercial
sources
.
DoD Directive (DoDD) 4151.1, "Use of Contractor and
Government Resources for Maintenance of Material," pre-
scribes that at least 30 percent of "mission-essential"
maintenance should be contracted out in support of the
mobilization base goal. The directive further states that
maintenance not considered "mission-essential" should be
contracted out.
The rational for requiring both organic and contractor
facilities was best expressed by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. In
summary, the rational is that [Ref. 3:p. 21:
Organic sources offer (1) the advantage of a controlled
source of competence dedicated to maintaining in a state
of readiness military weapons and equipment which will
be used in direct support of our military forces in
reaction to any contingency, (2) the assurance of a
capability to sustain that equipment in an initial
surge, and (3) provide a base for expansion.
Contractor sources provide a broader maintenance support
base capable of greater expansion in wartime. However,
because there is normally a time lag between identifying
a need for commercial maintenance support and the
ability of commercial sources to respond, it is impor-
tant that some part of mission-essential work be
assigned to contractors in peacetime along with non-
mission-essential workloads.
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The following table summarizes the major reasons
currently being cited for the distribution of mission-
essential workloads to commercial sources of repair.
TABLE 1
MAJOR REASONS WHY CONTRACT DEPOT MAINTENANCE
IS PERFORMED IN COMMERCIAL FACILITIES (Ref. 3: p. 6]
1. Depot Level Repairables which are similar in design
to or which are modified versions of commercially
operated Depot Level Repairables are most often
maintained by contract sources.
2. Organic support capability does not exist and the
investment to establish such support would be
excessive in relation to the volume and/or frequency
of workload requirements.
,3. To provide interim support for new items until
maintenance requirements are stabilized and organic
capability is established.
4. Systems which are reaching or have reached the end
of their mission-essential status are put on
contract to free organic capacity for support of new
material
.
5. Existing contract by another service supporting
similar or identical items.
C. REPAIR SOURCE SELECTION
Depot planning begins early in weapon system acquisition
to ensure that adequate capability and capacity are avail-
able to support failed DLRs throughout their service life.
The Hardware Systems Commands (HSC's) are responsible for
evaluating and certifying designated overhaul points ( DOP ' s
)
for each repairable item/family [Ref. 4:p. IV-11. The
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planners' selection process comprises analyses and decision
points wherein the advantages and disadvantages of the three
available sources of depot repair--organic, interservice, or
contract--can be compared.
A decision tree portraying the logic used in arriving at
the DOP choice is contained in the Appendix. This source
selection "decision tree" reflects Navy policy that organic
facilities should have [Ref. 5:p. 5]:
1. The repair capabilities needed to support front-line
weapon systems;
2. Repair capacity to satisfy projected wartime
workloads for these systems;
3. Sufficient workload in peacetime to ensure that
wartime capacity needs can be met.
As noted in Table 1 the current rational for distrib-
uting repairs to commercial depots is not consistent with
0MB Circular A-76, which emphasizes comparative costs; DoDD
4151.1, which emphasizes workload percentages; nor the
source-selection "decision tree". In the Rand Report,
"Depot Maintenance of Aviation Components: Contractor vs.
Organic Repair", the authors indicate that the majority of
component workload currently accomplished on contract
supports front-line weapons, whereas much of that done in
organic depots is for older systems. They offer the
following observations in explaination of this disparity
[Ref. 5:p. 51:
Many of these capability deficiencies result because the
necessary capital investments, which often entail multi-
13
million dollar expenditures for just test equipment,
have not been funded by the weapon system acquisition
programs. Acquisition managers have strong incentives
to keep program cost within targets without reducing the
number of weapon systems procured. System cost growth
is accommodated frequently by reductions in allocations
for support capability, including organic depot-level
maintenance capability.
D. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
The Navy utilizes several of its Uniform Inventory
Control Point (UICP) ADP programs to forecast repair
requirements. The goal of these programs is to ensure that
sufficient materials are in place when and where they are
required
.
The ICPs rely on information provided by the following
four UICP programs to assist them in the determination of
repair requirements for DLRs [Ref. 4:p. VIII-21:
1. Levels Program . Forecasts several key requirements
determination elements such as quarterly demand,
requisition frequencies, carcass returns, and repair
turnaround time. The program also uses this data to
compute wholesale requirement levels such as procure-
ment reorder point, procurement order quantity, repair
reorder point, and repair quantity.
2. Supply Demand Review . Recommends DLR buys in response
to attrition loses. The SDR program provides (1) a
comparison of assets to inventory requirements; (2) an
expedite action when requirements exceed assets; (3) a
termination recommendation when assets exceed
14
requirements; and (4) a redistribution order when a
stock point is below its allocation.
3. Cyclic Repairables Management (BOB) Program . In many
ways, 808 can be likened to the Supply Demand Review
(SDR) application. As SDR compares assets to require-
ments for the procurement problem, BOB compares assets
to requirements for the repair problem. The program
provides item managers with information about how many
DLRs to repair and at what time repairs will be
needed
.
4. Stratification Program . Compares forecast require-
ments to forecast asset levels to project future
procurement and repair requirements for budget
purposes
.
Utilizing the output from these programs the IMs notify
the HSCs, PMs, and DOPs of future repair requirement
projections on a periodic basis so that timely adjustments
can be made in existing depot capacity and capabilities.
Since repair requirements determination typically takes
place in a cyclic environment, only those requirements above
and beyond those previously provided to DOPs by the ICP's
are identified as new requirements.
E. CONTRACTOR REPAIR ACTIVITIES
The CDM repair process appears to be best described in
terms of six major functions; (1) material receipt;
15
(2) Inspection; (3) determination of repair agreement
coverage; (4) scheduling; (5) rework; and (6) Government
acceptance. Figure 2.1 Illustrates the relationships which




DLRs which fail in usage are given a condition code
of "F"l and are processed for return to the supply system in
accordance with the Master Repairable Item List (MRIL) for
repair. The MRIL contains a listing of all DLRs, their
designated overhaul points (DOP) or designated supply points
(DSP), and instructions or procedures for turn-in and
shipment
.
Within the MRIL those repalrables which are in short
supply and assigned to commercial DOPs are normally coded
for direct shipment to contractors' facilities. On the
other hand, those items in long supply are normally coded
for shipment to a DSP which will retain the defective asset
until the appropriate ICP determines that estimated quar-
terly overhauls (regenerations) will be insufficient to
support forecasted demand. At that point the ICP orders
additional carcasses to be sent to the DOP for repair.
2 Inspection
Upon receipt of the carcass the contractor will
establish a material control document to use in material
ICondltion code "F" is assigned to a failed DLR that Is






















































Contractor Repair Activities Flow Chart (continued)
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documentation and tracking. The control document also
provides the contractor with a vehicle for documenting the
physical condition of the carcass upon receipt and recording
all actions taken during the repair process.
The next step is an initial inspection. Initial
inspections are normally limited to a determination of the
carcass's proper identification and physical condition.
Several of the contractors contacted in this
investigation maintain a historical record on each of the
carcasses received for repair. These records facilitate
repair efforts and provide data for trend analysis of asset
performance. From this trend analysis adverse trends in
reliability or maintainability can be readily detected and
engineering changes proposed to reverse the performance
shortcoming.
3 . Determination of Repair Agreement Coverage
Following this initial inspection the contractor
will make a determination regarding the existence of an
applicable repair agreement. In most cases a basic ordering
agreement (BOA) will have been established to expedite the
repair effort. The BOA is a written instrument of under-
standing between the Government and the contractor which
contains appropriate contract terms and conditions. An
order under the applicable BOA terms and conditions will
represent the actual contract. These orders can be priced
retrospectively or they can be priced prospectively.
19
If it is determined that an Advance Delivery Order
(ADO) exists the carcass can be forwarded for repair without
additional delay. An ADO Is generally established for
critical assets, those comprising a small percentage of the
total DLR population, which experience high demand. The ADO
can be viewed as a form of Requirements Contract, in that
carcass receipt represents the Government's placement of an
order thereby triggering contractor efforts. The ADO has
been designed to affect timely repairs to a specified number
of assets during the period of coverage, usually six months.
If, on the other hand, it is determined that the
carcass is not covered by an ADO the contractor will contact
the Administrative Contracting Officer (AGO) to obtain a
delivery order. The delivery order represents the contrac-
tor's authorization to commence repair. This authorization
can not be given by the AGO until he has determined that the
number of carcass repairs being requested by the contractor
do not exceed the funding/quantity limitations established
in the ICP's delegation of repair program administration.
Those items received but not covered by a BOA or
alternative contract vehicle are, by necessity, delayed
pending negotiation of an individual repair contract.
The date of the delivery order or determination that
an item is covered by an ADO is important because it
triggers the contractor's "F" to "M" condition code




Two patterns of repair scheduling were noted during
this investigation. In the first case, the contractor
integrated the carcass directly into his production line.
Contractors utilizing this methodology cited the economies
obtained by (1) not having to train personnel specifically
for rework, (2) not having to establish a separate repair
line, or (3) not having to sustain a work force consistently
subjected to sporadic tasking. In the second case, contrac-
tors choose to undertake repair on a separate line. The
primary reasons cited for this methodology dealt with the
need to perform entirely different processes in the repair
effort .
5 Rework
Upon completion of the rework scheduling process the
failed carcass is forwarded to the applicable repair shop
and repair efforts commence. When the repair has been
completed, the DLR is presented to the government for
acceptance. If the shop determines that the carcass is
beyond economic repair (BER) the carcass is removed from
repair and scheduled for inspection by the Quality Assurance
Representative (QAR) . If this latter inspection confirms
the BER all salvageable parts will be removed and retained
for future repairs.
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6 . Government Acceptance
Upon satisfying himself that the DLR has been fully
repaired, the contract administrator or designated govern-
ment representative will sign off on the DD-250 form
signifying acceptance of the repaired DLR. It is at this
point that the contractor reports another condition code
change to the ICP; this time from "M" to "A" indicating that
the DLR is ready for issue. He then prepares the DLR for
shipment to a specified supply point.
F. CONTRACT DEPOT RTAT
The preceding description of the CDM process should
provide the reader with an understanding of the issues which
influence repair turnaround time or RTAT. The Commander,
Naval Supply Systems Command defines RTAT as that period of
time between [Ref. 61:
1. Date when an unserviceable item is requested for
induction by the depot maintenance activity and is
first reported to the Inventory Control Point (ICP)
as being in suspended (in work) condition.
Measurement Point ; Date when the Condition Code
transfer from unserviceable (repairable) ("F") to
suspended (in wor)c) ("M") is Transaction Item
Reported (TIR) to the ICP by the DSP, or "In Work
Date" (or "Receipt Date", "Delivery Order Date")
reported by non-TIR commercial / interservice depot
maintenance activities in status reports to the ICP.
2. Date when an item has been restored by a depot
maintenance activity to serviceable condition, and
is first reported as issuable to the ICP by the DSP.
Measurement Point ; Date when the Condition Code
changes from suspended (in work) ( "M" ) to service-
able and issuable ("A") and the information is TIRed
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by the DSP to the ICP, or "Completion Date" (or
"Shipped Date", "DD-250 signature date") reported by
non-TIR commercial / interservice depot maintenance
activities in status reports to the ICP.
3. Awaiting Parts Time ("G" Condition Code) will be
included in the calculation of the RTAT time
segment
.
The inclusion of awaiting parts time in the calculation
of contract depot RTAT differs from similiar calculations
occurring within organic depots. While current regulations
require organic DOPs to return a DLR which is awaiting parts
to its co-located DSP it is not cost effective to require
similiar actions by commercial DOPs which are located
throughout the country. Additionally, the ICPs do not
currently have a timely means to accurately obtain Condition
Code changes since commercial repair depots are not all
automated reporting activities.
The inclusion of "G" condition time presents a unique
obstacle to the accurate measurement of RTAT; for, depending
on who is responsible for providing piece parts, this time
may represent an excusable delay, which will not be counted
in elapsed RTAT, or as a delay which is included.
To maintain effective management control over DLRs in
the commercial repair pipeline, the IM's at ASO and SPCC
observe RTAT time and compare it to established performance
goals. Deviations between the two times form the basis for
management actions which are directed at individual item
problems and DOP performance in general [Ref. 4:p. XIl-3].
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Table 2, which follows, is a summary of the goals which
NAVSUP provided SPCC and ASO for the reduction of Repair
Turnaround Time.
TABLE 2
RTAT REDUCTION GOALS [Ref. 6, 1, 8 1
SPCC ASO
Goal (Actual) Goal (Actual)
Baseline (Mar 85 Strat.) 167 days (167) 67 days (67)
Ending FY 1986 137 (142) 56 (61)
Ending FY 1987 90 (118) 45 (62)
Ending FY 1988 60 45
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the reader with a general
overview of the rational cited by the Navy for its repair
source selections and methodologies used in the development
of repair requirements. The significant phases of the CDM
process were also discussed to illustrate the complexities
to be encountered in any attempts to reduce RTAT. Finally,
the NAVSUP goals for reducing RTAT were presented.
Chapter III will present an analysis of the causative
factors which have contributed to excessive RTAT within
contract depots.
24
Ill . ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT DEPOT RTAT
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to address the contract
related issues which impact repair turnaround time.
Differences between ASO and SPCC methodologies will be
highlighted to explain their impact upon RTAT. The specific
areas which will be discussed are:
1. Workload Forecasting - as it effects commercial DOPs;
2. Piece Part Lay-in - deciding between contractor or
government furnished material;
3. Tooling and Test Equipment - who is responsible for
lay-in; and
4. Undef initized Contractual Actions - preferred options
and impacts of recent legislation.
The primary focus of the analysis was to determine which
factors had the most profound effect upon RTAT time.
B. WORKLOAD FORECASTING
In the course of this investigation the researcher
learned that the development of an accurate workload
forecast is essential for: (1) the reduction of repair
turnaround time; (2) forecasting piece part lay-in; and (3)
forecasting tooling and test equipment requirements.
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Briefly stated the workload forecast is a method for
identifying yearly repair requirements. The forecast is
developed to facilitate reductions in RTAT, shorten the
administrative process and stabilize fluctuations in
workload at the DOPs [Ref. 9:p. 1.1].
Without a valid workload forecast it is very difficult
for the contractor or the government to assess the business
risks associated with repair. Historically, these forecasts
have only been accurate about 60 percent of the time
[Ref. 7). Due to this historical inaccuracy contractors
have become wary of the forecasts provided in repair
contracts. Contractors claim that their failure to receive
work as scheduled results in either idle capacity or
shortages which Impact upon their financial position
[Ref. 10, 11].
In recognition of these difficulties ASO and SPCC sought
to improve the quality of their workload forecasts. By
examining their universe of DLRs they were able to differen-
tiate distinct populations characterized by increasing
degrees of criticality. SPCC developed its populations by
differentiating approximately 107,000 DLRs into categories
displaying similar demand frequency, value or criticality.
Figure 3.1 provides the results of SPCC's differentiation
process. It should be noted that workloads are only
forecast for items experiencing demand in the last eight
quarters because of the time and effort required for this
26
Figure 3.1. SPCC DLR Universe.
Source: SPCC Contract Management Branch
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process. ASO undertook a similar effort for the DLRs under
its control. Figure 3.2 reflects the results of ASO's
differentiation process. Although the data is presented
with respect to family groupings similar logic has been
utilized in the differentiation process. The larger
percentage of DLRs workloaded at ASO (67% vs. 21% at SPCC)
can be attributed to the basic difference between the types
of assets being managed by the ICPs. SPCC manages material
for a number of end users having small populations, while
ASO manages components for fewer unique end users having
significantly larger populations.
The successful differentiation of demand has provided
ASO and SPCC increased leverage in their negotiations with
repair contractors.
C. PIECE PART LAY-IN
The availability of piece parts, either contractor
furnished or government furnished, represents a key element
in any effort to reduce RTAT . Recognition of the impact
that piece parts have upon the repair cycle pre-dates the
recent concerns over RTAT reduction. In November of 1973
the Naval Audit Service conducted the Navy's portion of an
Interservive Audit of the Management of Depot Level Contract
Maintenance Programs. They found that IRef. 12:p. a-lj:
The extensive use of GFM (government furnished material)
could be reduced to facilitate the award and administra-
tion of maintenance contracts on a total cost basis;
provide contractors with an incentive to use the minimum
28











Figure 3.2. ASO DLR Universe.
Source: ASO Weapons Policy, Repalrables Branch
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material required; reduce government administrative
costs; and permit greater emphasis on management of high
value material.
Although total cost (package) procurements are no longer
being performed the remainder of the auditors' coHunents
support ICP management's current calls for Increased use of
contractor furnished material (CFM)
.
When the government has responsibility for providing
piece parts several methodologies are employed to control
the parts distribution to contractors. The least control is
afforded by government funded delivery orders. Under this
arrangement the contractor prepares material "shopping
lists" for ICP review and validation. The Government will
then buy all material anticipated for the repair program.
Under this arrangement material estimates seldom err on the
low side of actual requirements. ICPs can achieve maximum
control over the material in contractors' hands by "pushing"
material to them following development of detailed supply
directives for scheduled repairs.
Additionally, when piece parts are provided as GFM the
government assumes responsibility for ensuring their
availability. Nonavailability represents an "excusable
delay" for the contractor. In effect, the contractor would
be held blameless for his failure to meet RTAT specifica-
tions .
Calls for increased use of CFM are attributed to the
high costs and risk which the government assumes under GFM.
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However, contractors interviewed during this investigation
were concerned that such a change would place undue risk
upon their organizations. They stated that, even though
much has been done to improve the quality of workload
forecasts, they still have concerns over the capital
investment which would be required to effect such a change.
One company, AiResearch Manufacturing Company of
California, has proposed a revision to the work specifica-
tions which would require "complete overhaul" vice "repair
to serviceable condition". They claim that this measure
would facilitate their projections for piece part require-
ments and reduce their risks. [Ref. 131
D. TOOLING AND TEST EQUIPMENT
Test equipment has also been identified as an area of
concern by those seeking to reduce RTAT. To address test
equipment it is first necessary to determine who is respon-
sible for its provision. During development of the acquisi-
tion strategy the HSC will plan for test equipment with
regards to the anticipated methodology for repair. This
determination will be reflected in the Integrated Logistics
Support Plan (ILSP). If test equipment is to be furnished
as GPM, the HSC having technical cognizance over the item
shall bear its cost [Ref. 4: p. XI-22]. If however test
equipment is not provided as GFM the contractor has respon-
sibility for its procurement.
31
utilizing techniques similar to those employed in the
analysis of piece part requirements the ICPs have been able
to identify test equipment shortages. In those cases where
a RTAT reduction was determined to be attainable and cost
effective additional test equipment has been requested /
required [Ref . 7 ]
.
E. UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS
Contract vehicles of all types have been utilized in
repair contracting. In the course of this investigation the
researcher learned that the principal contracting methods /
techniques used by ASO and SPCC for the repair of DLRs are
priced and unpriced orders under BOAs . While there are
several methods available from which to choose2, management
at the ICPs feel that in the existing acquisition environ-
ment the two methods mentioned above are best suited for
meeting their needs and goals.
In November 1986 the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1987 authorized appropriations for the
military functions of DoD and mandated improvements in
defense procurement procedures. Specifically, Section 908
of the Act, Public Law 99-661 required that limitations be
placed on the use of undef initized contractual actions
(UCAs). Unpriced orders (UPOs) are categorized under the
2FAR Part 16 contains a complete description of the




broad heading of undeflnltized contractual actions (UCAs).
This grouping includes letter contracts, unpriced change
orders resulting from engineering change proposals and UPOs
under BOAs . All group members share a common character-
istic, they are normally issued in advance of pricing and
are therefore priced after-the-fact.
Unpriced order BOAs have historically been recognized as
legitimate methods for reducing RTAT for two reasons: (1) a
BOA allows for the placement of an order without a price
proposal; and (2) less documentation Is required to award
and issue an order than under a more traditional form of
contract that is based on contractor proposals, field
pricing reports, and negotiations.
From a business standpoint UCAs were having a negative
impact upon procurement. A number of the negative aspects
which where considered in developing this legislation were:
(1) the Government is at a disadvantage in negotiating
price; (2) the contractor's incentive to control costs is
diminished; (3) the Government's inability to use expired
funds, set aside in excessively high pre-negotlatlon cost
estimates; and (4) the tendency for contractors to realize a
higher profit than the actual risk incurred would otherwise
dictate. (Ref. 14]
Spurred by the Inefficiencies noted above, the Congress
enacted Public Law 99-661 to limit the use of funds for
undeflnltized contractual actions. The law requires the
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service Secretaries to report to Congress when the level of
obligations for UCAs exceeds 10 percent of total obligations
for their respective Service. Additionally, the law
stipulates that if a service Secretary exceeds the 10
percent limitation for UCA obligations in any six-month
period, the Secretary will be prohibited from further use of
UCAs.
ASO and SPCC are concerned about the enactment of this
law because of the wording which characterizes unpriced BOAs
as undef initized contractual actions. Although management
at the ICPs contend that the law will have negative effects
upon the timeliness of repair contracting and obligation
rates, it is too early to evaluate the full impact of the
UPO initiatives.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter described the complexities that workload
forecasting, piece part lay-in, tooling and test equipment,
and undef initized contractual actions present the ICPs in
their attempts to reduce repair turnaround time within
commercial depots.
Chapter IV shows how the various terms and conditions of
commercial repair BOAs have been developed in response to
ICP RTAT reduction goals through an examination of five
actual basic ordering agreements.
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IV. KEY ISSUES IN COMMERCIAL REPAIR BOAS
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Using a modified case study approach, this chapter shows
how the various terms and conditions of commercial repair
BOAs address the complexities highlighted in Chapter III.
The primary purpose of the chapter is to underscore the
benefits derived from the chosen terms and conditions as
analyzed through the case study format. Repair BOAs
analyzed are with the following contractors: (1) Varian
Associates, Inc., Microwave Tube Division; (2) Hughes
Aircraft Co., Ground Systems Group; (3) Western Division GTE
Government Systems Corp.; (4) AiResearch Manufacturing
Company of California; and (5) Kaiser Electronics. These
particular contractors where chosen by contracting and
technical personnel familiar with commercial repair
contracting to provide the researcher a wide variety of
contracting methodologies currently being utilized in RTAT
reduction efforts.
B. REPAIR BOA TERMS AND CONDITIONS
There is a divergence of opinion as to what actually
constitutes an effective commercial repair BOA. Some
outside influences which affect the selection of terms and
conditions include equipment type, program requirements.
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maturity of program, service regulations, the contractor,
the quality and depth of contract administration expertise
available, and the contracting officer himself. Both ASO
and SPCC utilize an extensive "tailoring" process to address
these outside influences in the development of their
commercial repair BOAs
.
Table 3 identifies the commercial repair BOAs drawn upon
for this analysis. A comparative analysis demonstrates the





Varian Associates, Inc. N00104-85-GA003
Hughes Aircraft Co. N00104-84-GA037
GTE Government Systems Corp. N00104-85-GA007
AiResearch Mfg. Company of CA. N00383-85-G5427
Kaiser Electronics N00383-86-D3551
1 . Workload Forecasts
One of the major elements identified in Chapter III
as having an effect upon the repair contract is the realis-
tic estimation of repair quantities. Prior knowledge of the
workload was shown to be essential for the efficient
scheduling of manpower and machines to support a repairables
program. The following is a breakdown of the repair BOAs
workload forecast considerations:
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Varlan: - No workload forecast provided In BOA.
- Workload forecast provided in advance
delivery orders written by SPCC.
Hughes: - BOA provides workload forecast for select
group of critical assets.
- Advance delivery orders contain workload
forecasts for remaining items.
GTE: - No workload forecast provided in BOA.
- Workload forecast provided in quarterly
program reviews.
AiResearch: - Workload forecast provided for each family
of repairables within the BOA.
Kaiser: - Estimated quantity of carcasses to be
repaired provided for each family of
repairables cited on the** Listing of
Assemblies to be Repaired."
In recognition of its contribution to RTAT reduction
efforts, workload forecasts are generally being provided to
contractors in ADOs for the critical, fast moving Items
which are in short supply; the primary products of Varian,
Hughes, and GTE. Standard BOAs, on the other hand, are
being used for items experiencing only moderate demand.
The Government and contractor negotiate "realistic**
workloads on a quarterly basis for critical items, and an
annual basis for all others. An additional benefit gained
by this practice is the contractors' ability to immediately
induct into repair those carcasses cited on the ADO. This
procedure alone can result in a conservative four- to seven-
day reduction in RTAT by reducing the administrative burden
associated with the Induction of DLRs
.
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When the planned workload is not available produc-
tion workers will be idled and may have to be reassigned.
If carcasses arrive at random times, repairs will normally
be delayed pending carcass induction and personnel reassign-
ment. Such inaccuracies in forecasted workload can and do
cause major problems for the DOPs . If the DOP can assure
itself of a consistent workload it can staff the repair
facility accordingly and integrate the DLR workload into its
production efforts, thus avoiding unplanned excesses or
shortages in personnel and equipment.
2 . Piece Parts
The contracting officer has several options from
which to choose when planning for piece part lay-in. Based
upon the level of risk the contractor is willing to assume
piece parts may be provided, either, as Government Furnished
Material (GFM) or Contractor Furnished Material (CPM).
Piece part requirements are obviously driven by
workload forecasts. The importance of accurate forecasting
was addressed earlier with respect to dedicating personnel
and facilities at the DOP ' s . The same arguments apply to
the stocking and ordering of piece parts. The following is
a breakdown of program piece part considerations:
Varian: - Contractor shall furnish parts.
Hughes: - Government furnishes material based upon the
annual workload forecast.
- Contractor acquires parts through direct
procurement when GFM not available.
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GTE: - Government furnishes material yearly based
upon the workload forecast.
- Contractor requisitions material through
direct procurement when GFM not available.
AlResearch: - Consumable parts shall be furnished by the
Government either "in kind** or by the
placement of orders by the Government.
- Contractor will submit replenishment
reconunendations to ASO for review and
validation of range and depth.
- Material not available from the Government
within 30 days shall be acquired by the
contractor on an "as required" basis.
Kaiser: - Same as AiResearch.
Through tailoring the unique nature of each con-
tractor's repair program is addressed. Four of the repair
contractors receive GFM while one, Varlan, does not. The
use of GFM in these cases appears to result In more respon-
sive turnaround times, by minimizing long procurement lead
times, since contractors do not delay procurements pending
receipt of repairable carcasses. Given the historical
inaccuracy of the workload forecast, which drives the piece
part lay-in, it Is understandable why the DOPs would seek to
minimize their risk through GFM requests. Varlan, who
chooses not to utilize GFM is able to maintain Its respon-
sive RTAT because stable demand for its product over the
years has generated sufficient data to justify lay-In of
CPM.
However, there is a cost associated with GFM which
the ICPs need to consider. They should conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to ensure that costs of GFM are lower than
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the pipeline investment required for any given level of
readiness
.
3. Repair Turnaround Time
Specific and enforceable time limits must be
considered if the overall goals for RTAT reduction are to be
met. Inclusion of liquidated damages3 for failures to meet
specified delivery times may provide the needed "incentive"
to ensure timely return of an asset and preclude future
litigations. Another factor to consider is how long it will
take to perform the repair. It may not be physically
possible to affect the needed repair in either the 45 or 60
days of ASO's or SPCC's given goal. The following is a
breakdown of repair program RTAT considerations:
Variant - Turnaround times set forth in each BOA
delivery order.
Hughes: - 60-day turnaround time, provided that Item
is not beyond economical repair, or does not
have parts affected by long delivery
timeframes
.
GTE: - 90-day turnaround time, provided that
required piece parts and GFM test equipment
are available.
AiResearch: - 60-day turnaround time, provided that GFM
piece parts are available.
Kaiser: - 90-day turnaround time, provided that GFM
piece parts are available.
BLiquidated damages are sums of money which have been
expressly stipulated, by the parties of a contract, as the
amount to be paid if either party fails to uphold its end of
the agreement.
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Four of the five repair BOAs treat RTAT in essen-
tially the same manner, they acknowledge the fact that
repair times are contingent upon the availability of piece
parts. By tying RTAT to piece parts availability these
contractors have constructed a mechanism which further
reduces their risk of performance. In order to pass some of
this risk of performance back to contractors might it not be
more effective to incentivize RTAT along a graduated scale?
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter highlighted the benefits derived from
principal terms and conditions of commercial repair BOAs
which affect the reduction of RTAT time. Five different
BOAs were compared and analyzed.
The complexities identified in Chapter III and the
benefits highlighted in this chapter form the basis for the
conclusions and recommendations outlined in the next
chapter. One should not view the terms and conditions
outlined in this chapter as being all inclusive but rather
as significant issues that must be addressed in RTAT
reduction efforts.
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V. SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis has examined the Contract Depot Repair
process and current contracting techniques to determine if
the RTAT of DLRs managed by ASO and SPCC can be reduced.
At present ASO and SPCC are exerting considerable effort
to reach the Naval Supply Systems Command's RTAT goals of 45
and 60 days, respectively. If RTAT for DLRs can be reduced
the Navy may ultimately reach the anticipated savings of 100
million dollars.
The DOP repair cycle Is a complicated process that
requires numerous Interfaces between various organizations
and people. As a carcass is moved through the repairables
cycle these organizations and people must coordinate their
actions and ideas if they are to significantly reduce repair
turnaround time.
Chapter II provided the reader with a general overview
of the Contract Depot Maintenance cycle to illustrate the
complexities involved in any attempts to reduce RTAT. It
also provided a brief description of the rationale cited by
the Navy for its repair source selections and methodologies
used in the development of repair requirements.
Chapter III described the difficulties that workload
forecasting, piece part lay-in, tooling and test equipment,
42
and undef inltized contractual actions present the ICPs in
their attempts to reduce repair turnaround time within
commercial depots.
Chapter IV attempted to highlight the RTAT reduction
benefits currently being realized by the ICPs through their
handling of commercial repair BOAs
.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The author has determined that the commercial repair of
DLRs can not be treated in a purely statistical fashion with
100 percent of the emphasis placed on strict adherence to
quantifiable measures. When attempted in the past this
approach rapidly overloaded the ICPs and the contractors'
abilities to handle data efficiently. However, the current
procedure in which commercial repair of DLRs is treated as
an integrated program involving contractor and ICP manage-
ment personnel and contracting does appear to be working.
The specific conclusions and recommendations which
follow are based on the analysis in Chapter III of issues
affecting RTAT reduction and Chapter IV's review of current
practices and procedures for commercial repair of DLRs.
Recommendations offered are possible actions which can be
taken to reduce commercial DOP repair turnaround time.
1 . Workload Forecasting
Workload forecasting drives many of the policies and
procedures used by commercial depots. Based on forecasted
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workloads, DOPs plan repair part and tooling/test equipment
requirements to support the repairs of DLRs . Due to the
historical inaccuracies of the workload forecasts the DOPs
have been reluctant to dedicate personnel and facilities to
support their repairables programs.
The ICPs should implement a decision support system
(DSS) at all commercial repair depots to facilitate improve-
ments in the accuracy and consistency of their workload
forecasts. Currently, the ICPs only have approximately 30
percent of their commercial repair depots on automated
tracking systems.
The DSS could be modeled after SPCC's proposed
Commercial Asset Visibility, Phase II upgrade, (CAV II).
This system has been designed to operate in a fully auto-
mated mode, allow a wide range of transaction reporting, and
provide specific carcass tracking and accountability while
material is at the commercial DOP . CAV II will allow nine
basic types of transactions to be reported: receipts,
inductions, completions, shipments, requests for survey, BER
notifications, periodic inventories, reversals, and skele-
tonized Reports of Discrepancies. CAV II is being proposed
to replace SPCC's current asset reporting system which is
hampered by: (1) the limited range of transactions which can
be reported, (2) the manual effort required to transfer
contractor inputs to SPCC programs, and (3) the imbalances
created between financial and inventory records by its basic
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format. The potential benefits of daily mechanized trans-
action reports from commercial repair facilities would be
the increased efficiency of the ICPs day-to-day management
of high value mission essential assets and a reduction in
administrative efforts and therefore RTAT time.
Greater usage of advance delivery orders should also
be investigated. The elimination of unnecessary administra-
tive time via this procedure has been proven effective and
results in no loss of asset control.
2 . Piece Part Lay-in
Piece parts have a significant role in the timely
repair of failed DLRs
.
To improve the availability of piece parts and
preclude excusable delays, granted to contractors for
delinquent GFM, more emphasis should be placed on early
logistics support of new weapons system procurements by the
ICPs to ensure that sufficient material has been acquired to
support the repair program. This should improve the
availability of piece parts in the long run. The ICPs
should emphasize the use of Material Requirements Planning
programs at DOPs to capture piece part usage on DLRs as they
are repaired. Retention of this information by the ICPs
would facilitate more accurate determinations of repair part
requirements and assist in reducing contractors* financial
risks for material acquisition.
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3 . Undefinitized Contractual Actions
The author believes that recent legislation calling
for a reduction in the number of unpriced orders (UPOs) will
have negative impact on the commercial repair of DLRs . The
ICPs should seek regulatory relief or redress from this
legislation. This might be accomplished through a legal
interpretation that repair efforts are important enough to
be excluded from the provisions of this legislation. A
recent study concluded that, while the use of unpriced
orders has enabled procurement managers to aggressively meet
goals, "...the ability to choose the level of UPO activity
should be left to the acquisition manager as long as the
def initization requirements are met" [Ref. 15:pp. 41-43].
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . Primary Research Question
What are the key contracting issues and what method-
ologies might be utilized to reduce Repair Turnaround Time
within the Contract Depot Maintenance program?
The research leads the author to conclude that
additional changes to the contracting techniques currently
employed at ASO and SPCC are not required to address the key
contracting issues of (1) workload forecasting, (2) piece
part lay-in, or (3) undefinitized contractual actions.
Instead, it is believed that a spirited application of the
techniques now in place can be made to reduce RTAT
.
46
Increased management awareness and attention to the
benefits of streamlining the induction process as discussed
above, under Workload Forecasting, can have an effect on the
ICPs' ability to minimize RTAT.
Additionally, increased automation of the repair
planning process through the installation of a decision
support system, and emphasize on Material Requirements
Planning programs has implications for improved efficiency
and management information not available from the current
system.
2 . Subsidiary Question 1
What is Contract Depot Maintenance and how has it
been utilized on Navy repairable components?
As discussed in Chapters I and II, contract depot
maintenance is the repair of failed items needed in support
of the Military Departments missions by commercial sources
of repair. At ASO and SPCC contract depot maintenance Is
utilized (1) when organic support capabilities do not exist;
(2) as interim support for new items pending establishment
of organic support; and (3) when mature systems have reached
the end of their mission-essential status to free organic
capability for new systems.
3 . Subsidiary Question 2
What are the principal contracting variables or
factors which affect Repair Turnaround Time?
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As discussed in Chapter III of this thesis the
specific areas of concern to the ICPs in their attempts to
reduce RTAT time are: (1) Workload Forecasting; (2) Piece
Part Lay-in; (3) Tooling and Test Equipment; and (4)
Undef init ized Contractual Actions.
4 . Subsidiary Question 3
What are the critical areas where improvements can
be made within the contracting process to facilitate Repair
Turnaround Time reductions?
The answer to this question was addressed in Chapter
IV and the previous section of this chapter. It appears
from the research findings that increased management
attention and spirited application of the techniques
currently in place can result in further reductions of RTAT
time. Additional savings might be realized through the
installation of a DSS, and seeking redress on the UPO
limitation
.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Research conducted for this thesis has revealed the
following areas for further study. Since the research was
limited in scope and methodology, these areas potentially
have significant implications for continued improvements to
the procurement process:
1. Determine the feasibility of developing repair sources
with "broad scopes of repair," the ability to repair
equipment from multiple manufacturers. As discussed
in Rand's Report "Depot Maintenance of Aviation
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Components: Contractor vs. Organic Repair"
[Ref. 5:p. 6] a broad scope of repair has the poten-
tial to increase a contractor's efficiency and there-
fore lead to a reduction in its RTAT.
2. Investigate the potential for additional RTAT time
reductions by "breaking out" subcomponents to their
original manufacturers. Such a procedure would
eliminate the processing time currently required by
the prime contractor for receipt and trans-shipment of
components not undergoing in-house repair.
3. For those items having both organic and contracted
sources of repair determine specific processing
differences and their effect on RTAT. This could
identify processing techniques which would contribute
to RTAT reduction efforts.
4. Examine the applicability of cost reimbursement
contracts, which place greater performance risk on the
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